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Chief, []

26 March 1947

Chief, Covert Operations, Communications Division

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[] Communications

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1. In keeping with the phasing out of overt [] operations the following general communications considerations are presented for your information and possible guidance.

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2. It is proposed here to have the [] Communications Officer, in conjunction with the [] work out detailed plans for any possible [] equipment and/or personnel which may be required. Communications Division, Washington, is to be advised on plans and actions carried through.

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3. Inherent in any prior planning on cipher channels are a number of factors which are covered below.

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[] In keeping with this policy guide it is proposed to operate as closely as possible over existing [] networks. However, it is also considered important to be prepared in every possible manner for eventual contingencies which may arise in Asia. We have enumerated below certain generalized plans submitted for your guidance in planning and discussing the phasing out of overt [] operations and the in-phasing of covert operations. It is proposed, here, to have the [] Communications Officer, in conjunction with the [] work out the detailed planning involved on phasing out and [] equipment and/or personnel which may be required under the phase-in plans. Communications, Washington, to be advised, of course, on plans and actions carried through.

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4. Phasing Out

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It is our understanding that there are sufficient, perhaps an overage, of communications personnel available [] to handle the phasing out period. There is, we are sure, sufficient communications equipment to adequately handle any situation which may arise during the phase-out. For the guidance of [] we have, at present, several assignments in other overseas theatres for both radio operator-technicians and cryptographers and will do our best to retain and reassign capable communications personnel returned to the United States during the phasing-out period. The only possible equipment increments, as we see it at present, might consist of specialized electronic gear such as []

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[] Further details on such specialized equipment will be forwarded at an early date. The communications property, other than [] should be disposed of,

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if possible, [] through [] or to other government agencies. In connection with disposal we feel [] should be granted an option on our surplus property since we will be utilizing their [] radio network in the future. In the main, of course, Washington's general surplus disposal recommendations apply to communications equipment. It is further felt that all agent classified radio equipment, surplus to [] be destroyed beyond recognition and reassembly. This would mean that [] from the disassembled equipment may be disposed of, as such, through normal channels. It is felt that TR4 transmitters may be sold or disposed of after the [] labels are removed from the equipment.

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5. Future Cipher Problems

In connection with the phase-in certain problems arise for which we desire answers here in Washington. Through close liaison with

certain factors, listed below, which we need to consider.

1. What is the amount of lateral traffic among [] by the average group count per month between each pair of stations?

2. Are there any peculiar message routing procedures used among any of the posts []?

3. How many cipher text messages are transmitted to one or more addressees? Average group count per day & name of []? How many cipher text messages are transmitted to Washington and to other addressees in []

4. Does any one post in [] act as a reenciphering relay point? And does one station receive, decipher, screen, reencipher and retransmit an unusually large number of messages as compared to any other station []

5. How long does [] expect to continue to operate []

6. What is the pouch delivery time between Washington and each [] Is the pouch service satisfactory from a security standpoint?

These questions may best be answered in [] and it is suggested that [] attempt to ascertain the answers involved.

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
6. Future Equipment Planning

25X1 There are a number of alternative plans which may be applied
to the [] operation for the future. The plans enumerated below are
25X1 furnished merely as a guide. One such plan, or combination of plans,
or, for that matter, some entirely new plan, may be evolved by the Chief
of [] and his communications officer. It is felt here that the 25X1
best plan will result if such plan is placed into effect by [] person-
nel on the spot. This is particularly true due to the dynamic political
25X1 situation and indefinite future policy []. Below are listed
several generalized plans for your guidance.

[Redacted Content]

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Summation

The recommended plan, at this time, appears to be as follows:

1. Assist and augment [redacted] installations as much as possible during the phase out of overt [redacted] Operations. 25X1
2. [redacted] for the use of our people within [redacted] or other American interests, establishments for future use. 25X1

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[redacted]
Chief, Covert Operations
Communications Division

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